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LEGAL PREPAREDNESS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA:
IS VIRGINIA READY?
Kristen DiGirolamo

I. INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, April 29, 2009, a Mexican child, being treated at a
hospital in Texas, became the first casualty of the swine flu in the United
States. 1 By that time, hundreds of cases had already been reported
worldwide. 2 Healthcare officials have been worried about and planning for
an influenza pandemic since the first bird flu scare in the early 2000s. 3
Now those plans are being put to the test. Countries as far away as China
have put people under quarantine in an effort to stop the spread of the
H1N1 influenza strain. 4 In the United States, some schools have even
cancelled their graduation ceremonies. 5
Virginia has been taking its own precautions. On April 27, 2009, Dr.
Karen Remley, Virginia’s Health Commissioner, declared the
Commonwealth to be in a state of public-health emergency. 6 Virginia
Governor Timothy Kaine also requested an extra 280,000 courses of
antiviral medications to add to Virginia’s stockpile, bringing the state’s total

1. Toddler Dies as Swine Flu Cases Mount, CNN.com, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/04/29/swine.flu.cases/index.html?iref=newssearch (last visited
Apr. 19, 2010).
2. Id.
3. Ctr. for Disease Control, Past Avian Influenza Outbreaks,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/past.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
4. Farmer May Have Given Swine Flu to Pigs, Canada Says, CNN.com, May 2, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/02/swine.flu/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
5. Mallory Simon, Students Can’t Be Part of Main Graduation because of Mexico Trip, CNN.com, May
2, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/01/swine.flu.schools/index.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2010).
6. Tammie Smith &Jim Nolan, State Prepares for Flu Outbreak, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/local/article/VFLU28_20090427222106/264318/.
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stockpile to over 1 million. 7 While the state’s efforts show that it is being
vigilant in preparing for a mass outbreak, there is only so much that can be
done before the virus hits on a widespread scale.
Though it is too early to tell if this H1N1 strain will become a pandemic,
it will at least serve to keep decision-makers alert and thinking about how to
improve plans for pandemic response. One often forgotten aspect of
planning is the consideration of legal issues, which permeate every aspect
of a pandemic – from the planning to the clean-up stages. A public health
emergency, and especially one for a contagious disease like influenza, is
quite different than a natural or manmade disaster, like a hurricane or a
terrorist attack. There is no ground zero. Because the virus is spread
through human contact, it will spread to every corner of the globe. A
pandemic has the potential to affect every sector of the nation, from schools
to banking, from food distribution to, most obviously, the healthcare
system. The question is not whether hospitals will be overwhelmed; it is
whether hospitals will be open since healthcare workers are just as
susceptible to the virus as anyone.
So how can Virginia officials make sure that the Commonwealth is
legally prepared for a pandemic? One overarching problem of pandemic
planning throughout the country is that there has not been enough
communication between the legal community and the health community. 8
Healthcare workers have a set of norms they use every day, and they can
instinctively react to emergencies. In a pandemic, all of those norms get
thrown out the window, and what they instinctively want to do may not be
legal. 9 The first step to preparing for a pandemic must be to bring both
sides of the problem together. Another difficulty has been that even when
the legal and healthcare communities come together, they look at a few
issues, independent from each other. 10 For example, they will decide what
they can do about social distancing, distributing antivirals, and dealing with
surge in hospitals, but they might forget to ask who has the authority and
when they have that authority to make these decisions. And what if their
plans rely on a neighboring state’s aid, but that state cannot afford to
provide any additional resources? We cannot look at the legal issues of
pandemic influenza in a vacuum. This paper attempts to identify the legal
issues at stake during a pandemic and how those issues need to be discussed
as a whole when preparing. Part II of this paper will give a brief
7. Id.
8. Health & Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan,
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup8.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
9. See id.
10. See id.
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description of pandemic influenza and look at the Spanish Flu pandemic of
1918. 11 Part III will examine the origins of legal authority during a
pandemic at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Part IV will
look at some of the specific legal issues that may arise during a pandemic
and discuss what decision-makers need to be thinking about in order to plan
comprehensively. Part V will conclude by determining whether or not
Virginia is legally prepared for pandemic influenza.
II. HISTORY OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
A. What is Pandemic Influenza?
The problem with pandemic influenza is the unknown. Pandemic
influenza (“pan flu”) is different from the seasonal flu we experience on an
annual basis. 12 “Pandemic influenza is a global outbreak of disease that
occurs when a new influenza A virus appears in humans, causes serious
illness and then spreads easily from person to person worldwide.” 13
Because it is so rare, and because it is a mutated form of the seasonal virus,
humans normally have not built up immunities to it, making its effects more
severe, even for healthy adults. 14 Normally, when a person in their twenties
gets the flu, he might take two or three days off of work (or not, if he is a
law student) and feel better by the end of the week, especially if he got a flu
shot at the beginning of the season. This is will not be the case for
pandemic influenza. There is no flu shot for pandemic influenza, at least in
its beginning stages, because labs can only make vaccines for a known
virus. 15
The high level of contagiousness and severe symptoms of pan flu can
potentially lead to a catastrophic situation in which every part of our daily
lives is affected. No country will be safe, and every age group will be
vulnerable. In a time when global travel is the norm, the virus will spread
11. There were also pandemics in 1957 and 1968, but it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss
each outbreak in the United States. Ctr. For Disease Control, Influenza Pandemics of the 20th Century,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no01/05-1254.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010). Instead, I will
discuss the 1918 pandemic because it was the most severe in the country’s history, and note its
implications for legally preparedness now.
12. Virginia Department of Health, Pandemic Influenza, http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/PandemicFlu/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009) [hereinafter VDH Pandemic Influenza].
13. Id.
14. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, How Does Seasonal Flu Differ from Pandemic
Flu, http://pandemicflu.gov/season_or_pandemic.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
15. Virginia Department of Health, Pandemic Influenza: Vaccines and Antivirals,
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/PandemicFlu/Vaccines_Antivirals.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
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faster than ever across the world. 16 A pandemic could affect global markets
and create an economic crisis. 17 Access to utilities like power and water
could be disturbed if enough people become sick. 18 If our military is
exposed, which it no doubt would be in a widespread pandemic, our warfighting effort could be hampered. 19 While there is a possibility that it
could be mild, effecting thousands instead of millions, there is also the
possibility that the death toll could be astronomical, like it was in 1918. 20
B. The Spanish Flu of 1918
Perhaps one of the reasons the United States is so fearful of an influenza
pandemic is the history of the disease. In 1918, it is estimated that an
influenza pandemic (the “Spanish Flu”) killed 675,000 Americans in a
period of only ten months. 21 As World War I ended, thousands of soldiers
came home from Europe, bringing the virus with them. 22 This strain of the
virus brought 105 degree temperatures, severe body and joint aches, and
sometimes led to pneumonia. 23 The Spanish Flu also demonstrated a
common characteristic of pan flu—it occurred in waves. 24 The Spanish Flu
occurred in three different waves, one beginning in the spring of 1918, the
second in the fall of 1918, and the third in the spring of 1919. 25 The second
wave was actually the deadliest, claiming 90% of the total casualties. 26

16. World Health Org., Pandemic Preparedness, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en
(last visited Apr. 19, 2010) [hereinafter WHO Pandemic Preparedness].
17. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND
RECOVERY, 20-25 (Sept. 19, 2006) available at
http://www.flu.gov/professional/pdf/cikrpandemicinfluenzaguide.pdf.
18. See VDH Pandemic Influenza, supra note 12.
19. See WHO Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 16.
20. See VDH Pandemic Influenza, supra note 12.
21. ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 206
(Cambridge University Press 2003) (1976). While we cannot be sure how many died worldwide due to
inaccurate reporting, experts estimate that the Spanish flu killed an estimated 20 million people
throughout the world. U.S. Dep’tof Health and Human Servs, The Great Pandemic: Influenza Strikes,
http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/the_pandemic/01.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Influenza
Strikes]. In Virginia alone, over 15,500 people died. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., The
Great Pandemic: Virginia, http://1918.pandemicflu.gov/your_state/virginia.htm (last visited Apr. 29,
2010).
22. Influenza Strikes, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. THE THREAT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 8 (Stacey L. Knobler et al. eds., National Academic Press
2005).
25. Influenza Strikes, supra note 21.
26. GlobalSecurity.org, Homeland Security: Flu Pandemic Timeline/Event Dynamics,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-3_flu-pandemic-timeline.htm (last visited Apr. 19,
2010).
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There are numerous take away messages from the Spanish Flu. In 2006,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services hosted a workshop to look at lessons learned
from the 1918 pandemic. 27 An important issue the panel identified was the
necessity of truthful communication between public officials and private
citizens. 28 During the Spanish Flu, because of the political climate created
by World War I, public officials, in an attempt to subdue the fears of the
public, routinely lied about the seriousness of the virus. 29 There was great
disconnect in the information the public was getting from their elected
officials and public health officials. 30 This led to an atmosphere of distrust,
and it is this distrust that decision-makers need to be aware of when
planning, because, as one panelist said, “It is when people feel totally
alienated and isolated that society breaks down.” 31 When people feel
helpless, there is more potential for rioting or other outbreaks, requiring the
use of law enforcement during public health emergencies. Truthful
communication about the disease to the public may be the first step in legal
preparedness, because it has the ability to repress social unrest. While this
atmosphere of distrust can stem from poor communication, it can also result
from ill preparedness—what is the point of communicating with the public
if the government has no plans to ensure its safety? For this reason, fully
planning for pandemic response is vital to making sure that the government
does not have to respond to social unrest on top of a public health
emergency. This planning must incorporate legally preparing for issues that
will arise during a pandemic.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY
An essential aspect of legal preparedness is a firm understanding by all
those involved in pandemic response of who has what power and when they
have that power. Many times, the answers will be different depending on
the state, and even the locality.

27. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention & the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Pandemic
Influenza, Past, Present, Future: Communicating Today based on the Lessons from the 1918-1919
Influenza Pandemic (Oct.17, 2006), available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/workshop.pdf.
28. Id. at 8.
29. See id. at 7 (“There was a lot of cognitive dissonance. People heard from authorities and
newspapers that everything was fine, but at the same time, bodies were piling up.”).
30. See id. at 10 (“In Baltimore, there were fights between elected officials and public health
officials….In Pittsburg, the Mayor actually told the public to ignore public health officials.”).
31. Id. at 10.
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A. Federal Powers
Federal authority for regulating matters that affect public health initially
comes from the Commerce Clause and Congress’s power of the purse. 32
These Constitutional authorities, read broadly, have become the foundation
for numerous laws enacted by Congress to regulate public health
emergencies. The majority of federal powers to act during a public health
emergency are created in three laws: “the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”), the Public Health Services
Act, and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (“PAHPA”).” 33
Under the Stafford Act, the President may declare a state of emergency at
the request of a Governor when there is a disaster “of such severity and
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and
the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.” 34
Once the President has declared a state of emergency, federal resources,
including “personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial,
technical and advisory services” can be deployed to the state in support of
state and local recovery efforts. 35 A potential problem with asking for a
declaration of a state of emergency of which governors and their senior
emergency management staff need to be cognizant is that these federal
resources will likely be coordinated by federal authorities. 36 This may
come as a surprise to some state officials, and could present command and
control problems in the response and recovery of a pandemic. For example,
if federal resources in the form of antivirals are being distributed by federal
employees, those employees may not be aware of (or not be required to
abide by) a state plan for distribution. This could cause public confusion
about who will get the antivirals and where they are supposed to go. Part of
the legal preparation for a possible declaration of a state of emergency must
be a plan for the integration of federal resources into the state’s preexisting
response plans.
Under the Public Health Services Act, the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services may determine that there is a public health
emergency, allowing him to “take such action as may be appropriate to
respond to the public health emergency, including making grants, providing
awards for expenses, and entering into contracts and conducting and
32. Brian Kamoie, et. al., Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency Legal
Preparedness, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 23, 24 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.).
33. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public
Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 257 (2008).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2006).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(1) (2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(2) (2006).
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supporting investigations into the cause, treatment, or prevention of [the]
disease.” 37 This declaration will last 90 days, or upon termination by the
Secretary, whichever is sooner, but it may be renewed if needed. 38
Specifically, this Act allows the Secretary to track and distribute federally
purchased vaccines during a pandemic. 39 Finally, the Act has an incentive
built into it, allowing the Secretary to make awards to states that have
completed and implemented, among other things, a pandemic influenza
plan as part of their All-Hazards Public Health Emergency Preparedness
and Response Plan. 40
In 2006, Congress enacted the PAHPA, when the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina revealed the confusion cause by multi-layers of declarations, each
carrying its own authorizations for federal assistance. 41 It answers the
“who” question by identifying the Secretary of Health and Human Services
as the leader of “all Federal public health and medical response to public
health emergencies and incidents.” 42 While centralizing federal power in
one official should ease communication issues between states and the
federal government, decision-makers need to be aware of this power in
order to account for it in pandemic planning.
B. State Powers
The Governor of Virginia is the Director of Emergency Management and
has power to declare a state of emergency whenever “the safety and welfare
of the people of the Commonwealth require the exercise of emergency
measures due to a threatened or actual disaster.” 43 He also has the power to
request that the President declare a disaster so the state may be able to
obtain federal assistance. 44

37. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-1(a), (b) (2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a(b)(2)(A) (2006). This is an example of how the federal government uses its
purse to influence state governments. Though it is not able to mandate that states adopt certain plans, it
is able to provide incentives for them to do so. See Ernest B. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the
Constitution, and Control of Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 185, 192-193 (2008). See also
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program….The Federal government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivision, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”).
41. See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 33, at 261-62.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a) (2006).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17(7) (2002 & Supp. 2009).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17(8) (2002 & Supp. 2009).
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The position of State Health Commissioner of Virginia
(“Commissioner”) is established in the Code of Virginia at § 32.1-17. The
State Health Commission is the head of the Virginia Department of Health
(“VDH”) 45 and is responsible for coordinating VDH’s response to public
health emergencies. 46 Virginia also has the Virginia Board of Health, 47
which has the responsibility to “promulgate regulations and order to meet
any emergency or to prevent a potential emergency caused by a disease
dangerous to public health.” 48
A declaration of a state of emergency in Virginia triggers special powers
for the Commissioner. For example, during a state of emergency, the
Commissioner may authorize certain persons to dispense drugs when they
would not normally be authorized to do so. 49 The Commissioner may also
make use of any private or public building to enforce an order of quarantine
or isolation. 50 Even when a state of emergency has not been declared, the
Commissioner may “...require quarantine, isolation, immunization,
decontamination, or treatment of any individual or group of individuals
when he determines any such measure to be necessary to control the spread
of any disease of public health importance.” 51 This power is important,
especially at the beginning of a pandemic when only a few localities are
affected and the Governor has not yet declared a state of emergency. The
Commissioner may also require citizens to be immunized during a
pandemic if a vaccine exists. 52
C. Local Powers
In Virginia, each locality (both cities and counties) must have its own
local health department. 53 Typically pan flu spreads so quickly that the
Governor would react immediately and the state response system would go
into effect. However, before that happens, local health departments may
promulgate and follow their own rules and regulations, as long as they are
not “less stringent in the protection of public health than any applicable
state law or applicable regulations of the Board [of Health].” 54 Localities

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-16 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-19(D) (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-5 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42.1 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.017 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-43 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48(A) (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-30 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-34 (2009).
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will want to have plans in place for dealing with a sudden outbreak in a
hospital. In addition, the state needs to make sure that when writing its pan
flu plan, it accounts for the differences in localities, especially in Virginia,
where Fairfax County will have much more robust healthcare facilities than
Washington County.
D. First Responders
In addition to knowing who is in charge, it is important to understand
who will respond to a pandemic and how they fit into the command
structure of that response. The magnitude of pan a pan flu response will
require the assistance of numerous agencies, organizations, and individuals.
While very few of these individuals are actually “in charge,” many times
they are operating within a complex and confusing response network. One
of the first steps to legal preparedness must be to help every responder
understand his role in the system, and how to get what he needs to
adequately fulfill this role. As the Principal of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency Law Associates noted, “[g]iven the number and the
diversity of organizations that respond to a disaster and the lack of a single
‘commander’ of those resources, it is critical that these institutions ‘speak
the same language.’” 55
The federal government and many states, including Virginia, have
enacted laws and procedures to ensure that everyone “speaks the same
language” during an emergency response. After 9/11, President Bush
issued Homeland Security Directives 5 and 8, requiring the Department of
Homeland Security to create a National Incident Management System
(“NIMS”) to ensure that responses are quick and seamless between
agencies. 56 NIMS was approved on March 1, 2004, and “establishe[ed]
standard incident management processes, protocols and procedures so that
all local, state, federal and private-sector emergency responders can
coordinate their responses, share a common focus and place full emphasis
on resolving the event.” 57 Because NIMS provides a template for
managing emergencies, each locality and state should have the same

55. Abbott, supra note 40, at 193.
56. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb.
28, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html; Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec’y, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm. Part of these directives codified NIMS in
the Homeland Security Act. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 319, 320 (2002 & Supp. 2009). Note how this was a legal
response to an operating issue. See also Abbott, supra note 40, at 194.
57. Virginia Dep’t of Emergency Mgmt., Programs & Services: NIMS,
http://www.vaemergency.com/programs/nims/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 24 2010).
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information during a large scale disaster. 58 During a pandemic, if all
localities and states are NIMS compliant, volunteers will be able to travel
from one locality to another without having to learn a new system for
providing help and requesting resources. This coordination will be vital to
a successful response, especially in the chaotic atmosphere of a pandemic. 59
The federal government once again uses funding to incentivize the states to
adopt NIMS— compliance is required by both local governments and state
agencies to receive federal preparedness assistance. 60
IV. LEGAL ISSUES
On top of these complex systems of authority numerous legal issues for
pandemic response arise. This section will identify a number of these
issues, also show why it is important that decision-makers not look at them
independently, but comprehensively and within the existing law for public
health emergencies.
A. Social Distancing
Though many automatically think of quarantine as the first response to a
widespread public health emergency involving a contagious disease, there
are other less drastic steps that can be taken first. There are serveral ways
to create social distance between populations to try to stop the spread of pan
flu, including closing schools or offices, isolating infected individuals and
quarantining others.
1. Closing Schools and Offices
The first step in social distancing is voluntary. Parents can choose to
keep a sick child home from school and take time off of work during the
incubation period, which is five days after the onset of symptoms. 61 After
that, communities need to consider closing schools for a period of time in
order to reduce the level of exposure to the larger community. 62 As one

58. See generally Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, About the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
59. See Demetrios L. Kouzoukas, Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness: Legal Practitioner
Perspectives, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 20-21 (2008).
60. See
Virginia
Dep’t
of
Emergency
Mgmt.,
Programs
&
Services:
NIMS,
http://www.vaemergency.com/programs/nims/index.cfm (last visited May 8, 2009).
61. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Supplement 4, Infection
Control, S4-17, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/S04.pdf.
62. The Ctr. for Law & the Pub. Health , Legal Preparedness for School Closures in Response to
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report noted, “modeling and analyses suggest that widespread school
closures may reduce the incidence of infection (i.e. the attack rate) in a
community over a period of time.” 63 The same would be true of closing
offices or allowing people to work from home.
While closing schools may help to mitigate the spread of pan flu,
depending on the length of the closure, it could also have an adverse effect
on families and communities. Besides children missing school, potentially
for months, parents will also have to make plans to care for them. 64 If
parents have to leave their jobs to stay home with their children, the
economic stability of the community could be at risk. 65 For this reason,
states should work with the private sector to establish guidelines for
alternative work schedules during a pandemic, such as telecommuting.
Fortunately, because of advances in technology, this will be much more
feasible than during past pandemics.
Virginia has identified school closures as an option for controlling the
spread of pan flu in its Pandemic Influenza Plan. 66 This plan identifies who
has the authority to close schools: first it is “the ability of local school
boards and superintendents to close school is inherent in the power given to
them in Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia,” and second,
“the Board of Health has the authority to close schools in order to prevent a
potential emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public health (Code
of Virginia at § 32.1-42).” 67 The problem with these authorizations is that
they are not clear as to when and who may close a school. According to
this plan, the Board of Health is authorized to close schools by § 32.1-42 of
the Code of Virginia. This section reads:
The Board of Health may promulgate regulations and
orders to meet any emergency or to prevent a potential
emergency caused by a disease dangerous to public health,
including, but not limited to, procedures specifically
responding to any disease listed pursuant to § 32.1-35 that
is determined to be caused by an agent or substance used as
a weapon or any communicable disease of public health

Pandemic Influenza and Other Emergencies, 8, Apr. 2008, available at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/professional/school/schoolclosures.pdf
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Virginia Department of Education, Pandemic Influenza Plan: Guidelines for Virginia Public
Schools 5 (May 2008), available at http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/studentsrvcs/panflu.pdf.
67. Id.
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threat that is involved in an order of quarantine or an order
of isolation pursuant to Article 3.02 (§ 32.1-48.05 et seq.)
of this chapter. 68
This section never clearly states that the Board of Health may close
schools and does not say whether or not there must be a declaration of a
state of emergency by the Governor beforehand. Similarly vague, article
VIII, section 7 of the Virginia Constitution, which the plan claims gives
authority to local school board to close schools states, “[t]he supervision of
schools in each school division shall be vested in a school board, to be
composed of members selected in the manner, for the term, possessing the
qualifications, and to the number provided by law.” 69 Neither of these
sources expressly gives authority to either entity to close schools. While
that authority would probably be deemed by a court to be inherent, it leaves
the officials confused as to when they can close a school. This confusion
could lead to slow reactions, whereas, if the authority was expressly created
in law, response would be faster and more effective.
2. Isolation and Quarantine
Isolation and quarantine are more drastic steps aimed at restricting
people’s movements in order to limit the spread of pan flu by creating a
“social distance” between the exposed and the general population. Isolation
occurs when a patient who has been diagnosed with a communicable
disease is removed from the public. 70 A quarantine occurs when people
who have not been diagnosed with a communicable disease, but have been
or may have been exposed to one, are isolated from the public. 71 This
difference is important because, where people who have been diagnosed
will probably be willing to be isolated because they know they pose a health
risk to the public, people who have not been diagnosed may see no reason
for their quarantine and so may challenge it on constitutional due process
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-42 (2009).
69. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
70. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 195. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06 (2009) (“‘Isolation’
means the physical separation, including confinement or restriction of movement, of an individual or
individuals who are infected with or are reasonably suspected to be infected with a communicable
disease of public health threat in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the communicable disease
of public health threat to other uninfected and unexposed individuals.”).
71. See Abbott, supra note 40 at 196. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.06 (2008) (“Quarantine
means the physical separation, including confinement or restriction of movement, of an individual or
individuals who are present within an affected area, as defined herein, or who are known to have been
exposed or may reasonably be suspected to have been exposed to a communicable disease of public
health threat and who do not yet show signs or symptoms of infection with the communicable disease of
public health threat in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the communicable disease of public
health threat to other unexposed and uninfected individuals.”).
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grounds. 72 For this reason, it is vital that lawmakers carefully and clearly
lay out the circumstances in which people can be mandatorily isolated or
quarantined. It is equally important that these steps are followed during a
public health emergency.
For example, in Best v. St. Vincents Hospital, Best was diagnosed with
tuberculosis and detained by the hospital as a health risk to the community
because he was contagious and refused to complete his treatment. 73 He
sued the hospital and the state, claiming that his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights had been violated. 74 Best first argued that
his substantive due process rights had been violated because New York’s
tuberculosis control statutes violated his fundamental right to liberty. 75 The
court noted that “substantive due process comes into play where, regardless
of the procedures followed, a governmental decision or action is so contrary
to a fundamental right that it cannot be countenanced.” 76 Here, the court
found that Best’s liberty was a fundamental right, which had been
substantially infringed when he was held in the hospital against his will. 77
The only way the hospital could overcome violating Best’s due process
rights would be to show that the state had a “substantial governmental
interest” in detaining him against his will. 78 The court noted that previously
the Supreme Court of the United States had upheld the constitutionality of
quarantine laws as public health measures. 79 Finally, it found that there
must be an assessment of each individual to determine whether he would
comply with the hospital’s recommendations for social isolation during the
contagious period of tuberculosis, and that according to Best’s past
behavior, like refusing to continue his treatment, he would not be willing to

72. See Abbott, supra note 40 at 196-99.
73. Best v. St. Vincents Hosp., No. 03CV.0365, 2003 WL 21518829, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The
statute that authorized Best’s detention allowed quarantine for a person with tuberculosis when:
…there is a substantial likelihood, based on the person's past or present behavior,
that the individual cannot be relied upon to participate in or complete an
appropriate prescribed course of medication or, if necessary, follow required
contagion precautions for tuberculosis. Such behavior may include the refusal or
failure to take medication or to complete treatment for tuberculosis, to keep
appointments for the treatment of tuberculosis, or a disregard for contagion
precautions.

Id. at *9.

74. Id. at *1.
75. Id. at *5-6.
76. Id. at *6.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“Although this court has refrained from
any attempt to define the limits of [the state's police] power, . . . it has distinctly recognized the authority
of a State to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every description.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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comply with the hospital’s recommendations. 80 Therefore, while Best’s
substantive due process rights were violated, the hospital had a substantial
governmental interest in continuing his detention to protect the
community. 81
Best also claimed that his procedural due process rights were violated. 82
The statute allowing Best’s quarantine set out specific procedural guidelines
to be followed, such as obtaining a court order for the detention after a
certain number of days, and the court found that the hospital followed them
when detaining Best. 83 Additionally, the court found that the processes laid
out in the statute were sufficient to protect his procedural due process under
the Constitution. 84
Best is important because it highlights potential legal issues with
quarantine laws for pan flu. It is because of the constitutional
challenges in Best that states must be legally prepared to handle
possible quarantine. If a state is not legally prepared for a quarantine,
then, in the midst of an influenza pandemic, the courts could become
backlogged with complaints and sick people could be allowed back into
the community on a legal technicality.

Fortunately in Virginia the Attorney General’s office and VDH have
worked hard to ensure that the state is legally prepared for quarantine
during pan flu. 85
Under §32.1-43 of the Code of Virginia, the
Commissioner has the authority to require quarantine or isolation of an
individual or group when he determines that it is “necessary to control the
spread of any disease of public health importance.” 86 Under normal
circumstances, before a person can be isolated or quarantined, there are
detailed procedures that must be followed. 87 During a pandemic, these
procedures, which include an investigation to find that the individual has a
communicable disease and is engaging in “at-risk” behavior, will likely be

80. Best, 2003 WL 21518829 at *7.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *9.
83. Id. at *10.
84. Id. at *13.
85. See Va. Dep’t of Health & Va. Attorney Gens. Office, An Overview of the Commonwealth of
Virginia’s Statutory Authorities Relevant to Social Distancing, July 31, 2007,
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/EPR/pdf/Social%20Distancing%20Law%20Project%20Phase%20I%207_
31_07.pdf [hereinafter Overview of Virginia Social Distancing].
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-43 (2009).
87. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-48.02, 32.1-48.03, 32.1-48.04 (2009).
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too cumbersome and lengthy to make the isolation or quarantine effective. 88
In this situation, the Commissioner may find that there are “exceptional
circumstances” 89 and,
initiate a more rapid response by: issuing order to
immediately isolate an infected or potentially infected
person; issuing orders to immediately quarantine exposed
or potentially exposed persons; [or] issuing orders to isolate
and/or quarantine individuals as a group through defining
an ‘effected area’ (when a state of emergency has been
declared by the Governor for the affected area). 90
Even during exceptional circumstance, there are specific procedures that
must be followed to insure that an individual’s due process is not violated. 91
Virginia’s legal and health communities have created a comprehensive
legal scheme for isolation and quarantine. This preparation will enable
health care officials (as long as they abide by the procedures set forth in the
Code of Virginia) to efficiently and effectively distance exposed and
infected individuals from the general population without major legal
problems holding up the process. This fast response is key to ensuring the
spread of pan flu is curtailed as quickly as possible.
B. Mutual Aid and Liability Concerns
During any public health emergency, resources of a community can be
quickly overwhelmed, making it necessary to rely on outside assistance.
This assistance can come from other states, volunteer organizations or the
private sector. However, the additional assistance comes with liability
concerns. According to one study,
Almost sixty percent of clinicians indicated that having
medical malpractice insurance coverage would be
important (24.3%) or essential (35.4%) to their decision to
travel out of state to provide assistance during an
emergency. Almost seventy percent of respondents

88.
89.
90.
91.

VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.02 (2009).
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.05 (2009).
Overview of Virginia Social Distancing, supra note 85, at 14.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-48.05, 32.1-48.07 (2009).
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answered that immunity from civil lawsuits would be an
important (35.6%) or essential (33.8%) factor when
considering whether to volunteer in an emergency. 92
Especially amidst the chaos of a pan flu epidemic, health care
professionals and volunteers will have to work quickly and perhaps at a
lower standard of care than what they would normally provide. This opens
them up to negligence suits, from which they will want immunity if they are
going to provide assistance.
1. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (“EMAC”)
EMAC was developed as a mutual aid agreement among the states to
address issues of liability and resource sharing up front so a state does not
have to be concerned with these issues during an emergency. 93 Virginia
codified the EMAC in 1995. 94 One of the main purposes of the EMAC is
to promote “[t]he prompt, full, and effective utilization of resources of the
participating states, including any resources on hand or available from the
federal government or any other source, that are essential to the safety, care,
and welfare of the people in the event of any emergency.” 95 As long as the
assisting state does not need the resources for its own emergency, it must
provide assistance (including use of National Guard Forces) to the
requesting state. 96
Two important provisions of the EMAC discuss licensing and liability.
Under Article V, a person who is licensed in one state to provide services
will be deemed to be licensed in the requesting state to provide those same
services during a declared emergency. 97 This is important because
normally a nurse, for example, would only be able to practice in the state in
which she is licensed. 98 EMAC recognizes that during a pandemic, nurses
do not have time to register in another state, and carves out an exception
from the existing law for assistance during declarations of emergencies.

92. Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health
Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1917 (2008).
93. See generally National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, http://www.emacweb.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (explaining that EMAC is an
organization that provides “form and structure to interstate mutual aid.” EMAC allows impacted states
to request and receive assistance quickly and efficiently.).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1 (2009).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1, art. II (2009).
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1, art. IV (2009).
97. See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.28:1, art. V (2009).
98. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3005, 54.1-3008 (2009).
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Under Article VI, the EMAC limits liability for officers or employees of
the assisting state. 99 It provides,
No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in
another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on
account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of
such forces while so engaged or on account of the
maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in
connection therewith. 100
While EMAC limits liability for acts or omissions “in good faith,” it does
not limit liability for willful misconduct, gross negligence, or
recklessness. 101 This is an important distinction, because resources will be
coming in from many different places—individuals must have a legal
recourse for injuries they sustain due to a complete lack of care by officials
or employees of the assisting state. Some experts have noted that legal gaps
remain in this section of EMAC. The limited liability protection only
applies to officers and employees of the assisting state, but not to other
individuals, and it does not apply before the governor of the requesting state
has declared a state of emergency. 102 These important issues will have to
be addressed in other sections of the law.
2. Volunteers and the Private Sector
During a pandemic, Virginia’s state and local resources will quickly be
exhausted. Federal aid may or may not be available, depending on the
severity and spread of the virus. Volunteers, both individuals and
organizations, will be critical to Virginia’s response. As was previously
noted, volunteers may be hesitant to come forward if there are no limitation
of liability laws to protect them. Virginia has recently expanded traditional
immunity statutes (which only protected government employees) to cover
volunteers during emergencies.
Virginia is one of many state that have Good Samaritan statutes that limit
liability for individuals who render aid at the scene of an accident and
Virginia is no exception. 103 The Code of Virginia protects individuals and
doctors who render aid without receiving compensation during an

99. See VA. CODE ANN. §44-146.28:1, art. VI (2009).
100. VA. CODE ANN. §44-146.28:1, art. VI (2009).
101. VA. CODE ANN. §44-146.28:1, art. VI (2009).
102. Rick Hogan, et al., Assessing Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination for Public
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 36, 39 (2008).
103. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(A)(1) (2009).
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emergency. 104 This statute leaves a gap for pan flu, which is an ongoing
condition and not an “emergency” as we would generally think of the word.
There is another statute specifically granting immunity to healthcare
providers who provide aid during disasters or emergencies, and an
emergency in this statute will include pan flu.105 This statute may assist
healthcare providers who will be the primary responders during pan flu, but
they will still need the assistance of other groups to provide additional aid
and resources.
In 2004, Virginia codified immunity for two volunteer groups: the
Medical Reserve Corps and Community Emergency Response Teams. 106
The Virginia Medical Reserve Corps are “teams of local volunteer medical,
public health professionals, and community members who volunteer to
contribute their skills, expertise, and time to support ongoing public health
initiatives and public health emergencies in localities across Virginia.” 107
Community Emergency Response Teams (“CERTs”) are locally based
groups of volunteers (training is open to any citizen) that come in during a
disaster to provide assistance to first responders. 108 These groups are
provided civil immunity as long as they perform their duties in good faith
and in accordance with Virginia law and regulations. 109
But what about the volunteers who are not part of these groups (like
church groups or Red Cross volunteers)? Just this year, the Virginia
General Assembly passed limited liability legislation for individuals and
groups who volunteer:
1) pursuant to a Governor-declared emergency or during a
formal exercise or training of the State Department of
Emergency Management or a responsible county or city
emergency management entity; and 2) at the request and
direction of the State Department of Emergency
Management or a county or city employee whose
responsibilities include emergency management. 110

104. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(B) (2009).
105. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-225.01, 8.01-225.02 (2009).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 31.2-48.016 (2009).
107. Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Medical Reserve Corps, http://www.vdh.state.va.us/mrc/
(last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
108. See e.g. Charlottesville-UVA Albemarle County CERT, What is CERT?,
http://www.charlottesvillecert.org/ (last visited May 8, 2009).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 31.2-48.016 (2009).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.23(F) (2009).
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Though there has not been a case law to test this new statute, it seems
that it would cover volunteers rendering aid during a pandemic from civil
liability for injury or death. 111
3. Standards of Care
The primary cause of action brought by individuals who are harmed
during a pandemic will be for negligence. Whether or not they are
successful with a negligence claim will be depend on what the court
determines the standard of care during a pandemic to be. Some healthcare
professionals have tried to alter the normal medical standards of care for
public health emergencies because they know their resources—and their
services—will be overwhelmed and they will not be able to perform as they
normally would. 112
The Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association put together a working
group to address altered standards of care in Virginia. 113 The legal standard
of care requires that a practitioner “use the degree of skill and diligence in
the care and treatment of his patient that a reasonably prudent doctor in the
same field of practice or specialty in this State would have used under the
circumstance of this case.” 114 According to this definition, during a
pandemic a court would take into consideration the circumstances under
which the treatment was given, including the scarcity of resources. 115
Virginia should adopt clear guidelines for distribution of scarce resources
during an emergency so that healthcare providers may be sure that they will
be deemed to have followed the standard of care if they adhere to those
guidelines. 116
C. Allocation of Scarce Resources
Resources will be quickly expended in the event of a public health
emergency in which a large percentage of the population is infected. It is
important to remember that resources are not just things, like hospital beds
and medication, but also people.

111. See VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.23(F) (2009).
112. See generally Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Altered Standards of Care in Mass
Casualty Events: Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies,
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
113. See Steven D. Gravely, Altered Standards of Care: An Overview 5, www.vdh.state.va.us/
EPR/pdf/Health_and_Medical_Subpanel.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id. at 7.
116. See id. at 10.
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1. Things: Distribution of Vaccines and Antivirals
When allocating scarce resources, liability is only a minor concern for
healthcare providers compared to the ethical considerations of using
resources to save some lives while letting others die. During a pandemic,
“healthcare providers will be in the conspicuous and unfortunate position of
turning away many deathly ill people.” 117
Virginia has a stockpile of about one million courses of antiviral
medication for influenza, 118 but Virginia also has a population of almost
eighth million. 119 That means that even if Virginia decides to use its entire
stockpile during a pandemic, seven million people will not get the
medication. When people find out they will not be able to obtain the
antiviral, there is a potential for civil unrest, delaying response efforts even
further. For this reason,
[I]t is imperative that we begin drafting and publically
justifying our selection criteria now, well before a
pandemic is upon us. The stakes are so high, and the issue
so volatile, that the public must come to understand and
accept, if only somewhat passively, the rationale for
distribution well before an epidemic strikes that will
inevitably stir up chaos in its wake. 120
The CDC recognizes that pandemic influenza is inherently different than
normal seasonal flu vaccine allocation, in which the criteria for providing
vaccines is based on who is at the highest risk for death. 121 During a
pandemic, the CDC suggests that the criteria should be based on
“preserving the functioning of society” and that “[t]hose individuals who
are essential to the provision of health care, public safety and the
functioning of key aspects of society should receive priority in the
distribution of vaccine, antivirals and other scarce resources.” 122

117. Meir Katz, Bioterrorism and Public Law: The Ethics of Scarce Medical Resource Allocation in
Mass Casualty Situations, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 795-96 (2008).
118. See discussion supra Introduction.
119. U.S. Census Bureau, State and City Quick Facts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
120. John D. Arras, Rationing Vaccine During an Avian Influenza Pandemic: Why it Won’t Be Easy, 78
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 283, 284 (2005).
121. Ethics Subcomm. of the Advisory Comm. to the Dir., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Preventions,
Ethical Guidelines in Pandemic Influenza 2-3 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/phethics/panFlu_Ethic_Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Ethical Guidelines].
122. Id. at 3.
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Virginia, of course, does not have to accept this guidance when
developing its own allocation plan. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services has actually created a priority list in its Pandemic
Influenza Plan which includes the population to be vaccinated or given
antivirals and the rationale for putting them in certain tiers. 123 For example,
the top tier includes vaccine and antiviral manufacturers and healthcare
workers who are in direct patient contact. 124 The rationale for putting
vaccine and antiviral manufacturers in the top tier is that we want “to assure
maximum production of vaccine and antiviral drugs.” The rationale for
putting healthcare workers who are in direct patient contact in the top tier
rests on the premise that “healthcare workers are required for quality
medical care” and “there is little surge capacity among healthcare sector
personnel to meet increased demand.” 125
Whatever course Virginia takes, it is essential that the justifications for
prioritization are legally sound and that the process for distribution is fair.
The CDC noted that there needs to be “consistency in applying standards
across people and time.” 126 If Virginia does not distribute vaccines and
antivirals based on a fair classification of individuals or groups, it opens
itself up to claims of equal protection violations. 127
2. People: Compelling Healthcare Professionals to Work
Vaccines and antivirals are not the only resources that will be scarce
during a pan flu epidemic; convincing healthcare providers to work while
their families are sick and there is a high risk of infection will not be easy.
The American Medical Association “declared that ‘individual physicians
have an obligation to provide urgent medical care during disasters’ and
expressly stated that ‘[t]his ethical obligation holds even in the fact of
greater than usual risks to their own safety, health or life.’” 128 Yet other
experts have stated, “physicians should not be expected to place themselves
at greater risk than the benefit they can provide.” 129 It is unknown what the
123. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Appendix D: NVAC/ACIP
Recommendations for Prioritization of Pandemic Influenza Vaccine and NVAC Recommendations on
Pandemic Antiviral Drug Use (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf.
124. Id. at D-13.
125. Id.
126. Ethical Guidelines, supra note 121, at 5.
127. See generally Katz, supra note 117, at 805-06.
128. Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals to Work during
an Influenza Pandemic 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (quoting Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs,
Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations § 9.067 (2008)).
129. Karine Morin et al., Physician Obligation in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 15 CAMBRIDGE
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response of healthcare providers will be the event of a 1918-scale pan flu
epidemic. On one hand, during the HIV crisis in the 1980s, some
physicians refused to treat patients who had the virus.130 On the other hand,
most physicians continued to work during the SARS epidemic. 131
Some states require healthcare providers to work after a declaration of a
public health emergency. 132 While Virginia has no such statute, it does
have one provision that directs the officers and personnel to cooperate with
the Governor or the Virginia Department of Emergency Management in any
requests for “services, equipment, supplies and facilities.” 133 This language
is much softer than the South Carolina statute, and will not compel
individuals, even those employed by a state agency, to work during a
declared emergency. Whether healthcare professionals work will likely be
left up to their individual judgment, which will be heavily influenced by
their ability to obtain vaccines and antivirals, and their immunity from civil
liability. This is an example of how preparedness for the allocation of
scarce resources is directly related to other aspects of pandemic planning.
V. CONCLUSION
Planning for pandemic influenza presents special challenges. It is not a
typical emergency type situation, like a hurricane or even a terrorist attack,
where the emergency is centrally located in one area of the country. Pan flu
has the potential to reach every community in the United States and spread
throughout the world.
Resources will be scarce and healthcare
professionals will not be able to rely on normal standards of operation. Pan
flu requires early and extensive planning, and that planning must include
the legal community. Each issue that will come up during a pandemic
affects the others, and a firm legal basis for the plans the government does
adopt is essential to efficient response.
To answer the question presented in the title, “Is Virginia Ready?,” is
impossible. We will not know if we are ready until a pandemic has come
and gone. Virginia has a strong start for pandemic planning, though there
are still some areas that need to be clarified. 134 While the Code of Virginia
may be clear as to some issues like quarantine and isolation, decision-

Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417, 420 (2006).
130. Coleman, supra note 128, at 11.
131. Id. at 13-14.
132. See e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-570 (2002 & Supp. 200).
133. Va. Code §44-146.24 (2008).
134. See discussion supra Part IV (A)(1).
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makers need to make sure the law is properly translated into the plans and
that those plans are properly understood by those who will be in charge and
responding to pan flu. The creation of laws and procedures is only one
step; the best response will be characterized by open communication
between all levels of government, responders, and citizens as well as
comprehensive planning, which must be anchored by a foundation of legal
preparedness.

